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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This is the Final Report of the ‘RMPP project’ (Scientific Diversity, Scientific 
Uncertainty and Risk Mitigation Policy and Planning project), which addressed 
the use and utility of science and other forms of knowledge by natural hazard 
practitioners, and the pragmatic meaning these hold for their risk mitigation work. 
Natural hazard managers often expect, and are expected, to achieve 
outcomes by using scientific facts and rational problem-solving to increase 
certainty of decisions in the face of hazardous events (Funtowitcz and Ravetz, 
2003). At the same time, the uncertainties of natural hazards means that this 
sector has always set different terms to the this ‘pipeline’ approach to the use 
science (also called the ‘linear model of scientific expertise’). 
The ability of policymakers and practitioners to explain and justify risk mitigation 
and its evidence is compromised without greater insight into how science and 
other forms of knowledge are used in emergency management policy and 
practice. The sector does not receive the full range of information it requires, and 
continues to be vulnerable to the perpetuation of ‘myths’ about science, its use 
and its usefulness.  
Instead of relying on facts to generate better policy and practices, as invaluable 
as they are, we ask: 
• what are ‘facts’,  
• how do facts, values and action interrelate, and 
• what are the implications of these insights to allow practitioners to make 
better decisions? 
Two literature reviews were conducted, the first examined the use of scenario 
methods for environmental risk, and the second identified the types of scientific 
uncertainties in flood and bushfire science.  
These uncertainties were then organised into three categories:  
• historicist, reliance on historical data, due to assumed determining 
relationship between the past, the present and the future 
• instrumental, uncertainty arising out of limitations of a given apparatus, 
heuristic or theory, and  
• interventionist, are those uncertainties in the predictive calculations 
about the effect of mitigation interventions (e.g. flood levy banks).  
Three case studies were conducted, each located in an important risk 
landscapes in which scientific knowledge was being used to change policy 
and/or practice and address a complex emergency management problem:  
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• Wildfire risk and prescribed burning, in the Barwon-Otway region, 
Victoria;  
• Wildfire risk and an invasive fire-weed, in the Greater Darwin area, 
Northern Territory; and, 
• Flood risk and mitigation planning in the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley, 
New South Wales. 
 
Across all three case studies, common insights were summarised as: 
 
• Science is critical, but it is not everything, as it cannot answer many big 
questions. 
• Complexity is irreducible, as risk mitigation is full of subjective ‘non-
rational’ factors, that cannot be reduced to a prediction or model.   
• Experience is vital, although it is viewed as less authoritative than 
evidence.   
• Making things ‘count’ is important, and in this science was judged as 
more authoritative than other evidenced-based expertise. 
• There is confusion about what is a fact. Practitioners regularly expressed 
opposing positions about certainty, and misunderstandings commonly 
proliferated around what is meant by the ‘facts’.   
• Science has a social life. When evaluating complex science, 
practitioners draw on relationships of trust with individuals, who were not 
necessarily scientists. 
• Practitioners are not automatons, but seek out different strategies to 
address the problematics of their current work context,  in relation to 
their own perceptions and priorities. 
• Success is often neither attainable nor evident. Mitigation decisions 
relating to smaller emergency events may go unnoticed precisely 
because mitigation was effective, however the large events where 
mitigation is partially effective is where their actions will be scrutinized 
and blame will be sought.   
• Decision-making is embodied.  Practitioners are under considerable 
stress as a result of the complexity they face, their personal concern for 
the people present in a risk landscape during a hazard event, and their 
limited capacity to mitigate risk.   
 
Influential assumptions about the use and utility of science were found to have 
the following substantial consequences for practice:  
 
• less efficient use of research-practice risk mitigation monies,  
• more stressful work conditions for risk mitigation practitioners, and  
• less effective risk mitigation policies and practices for all.  
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As natural hazard risk mitigation is inherently complex, knowledge diversity is 
needed for practitioners to better understand where the various contributions 
of science lie, where the contribution of other knowledge lies, and the differing 
value and utility these have to the matter of concern.  
 
With this, they have the potential to consider a broader scope of options, make 
better risk mitigation decisions and more effectively defend them.  
 
In support, we offer natural hazard risk mitigation practitioners a set of 
guidelines focussed on moving from finding the risk mitigation solution, to a 
more pragmatic approach that embraces risk complexity and uncertainty.  
 
Through our research and case studies, we see parts of the emergency 
management sector is already pioneering this work, and in doing so, is 
providing leadership for the broader public sector grappling with related issues 
of climate change and sustainability.   
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END-USER STATEMENT 
Ed Pikusa, Department for Environment and Water, SA 
 
As emergency management practitioners, we are all focused on making the 
best possible decisions with the best available evidence to reduce risks to the 
community as much as we can.  Many of the settings in which we do this 
contain significant complexities and uncertainty.   
 
The value of scientific ‘facts’ and evidence is often used as the basis of decision 
making, but in complex settings, the value of such evidence is often less than 
we think.   
 
It is easy to take science on face value when making a decision.  The research 
in this project suggests this often creates additional problems by ignoring 
uncertainties.  For example, extra uncertainties occur when decision-makers 
minimise the non-scientific expertise of other practitioners, arbitrarily select the 
‘facts’ that are used, and assume that the science is correct, accurate and 
totally applicable to the risk environment.   
 
This project has used research and case studies to illustrate the value of 
scientific evidence, focusing on three particularly complex and important 
emergency management problems across fire and flood in Australia. Indeed, 
the flood case study meets the criteria for a ‘wicked’ problem.  
 
The project shines a light on the uncertainties of scientific information, and gives 
practitioners a language to recognise and understand how ‘facts’ and 
‘science’ may not be as absolute and certain as we think.   
 
Better decisions in complex and uncertain settings can be made by taking a 
different perspective, embracing uncertain scientific evidence as part of a 
broader understanding of the risk environment, and making better decisions 
while being comfortable with the uncertainty.  
 
This is a project that presents its understanding of myths around scientific 
evidence, and provides practitioners with guidelines to make better decisions.   
 
The opportunity and challenge this project presents is as much cultural as it is 
scientific.  Practitioners need to recognise that it may be uncomfortable to 
discount science on face value, and invest time in embracing evidence within 
an uncertain and more complex environment.   
 
This project has shown through three case studies how this can be done, and I 
welcome more practitioners to do the same.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This is the Final Report of the ‘RMPP project’ (Scientific Diversity, Scientific 
Uncertainty and Risk Mitigation Policy and Planning project), which addressed 
the use and utility of science and other forms of knowledge by natural hazard 
practitioners, and the pragmatic meaning this holds for their risk mitigation work. 
The project was part of the Governance and Institutional Knowledge cluster of 
the BNHCRC, and was a collaboration between the Institute for Culture and 
Society, Western Sydney University and the Fenner School of Environment and 
Society, The Australian National University.  
 
New public policy positions for bushfire and flood risk planning, preparedness, 
response and recovery rely on best practice scientific evidence; however, 
scientific evidence does not always meet the knowledge needs of risk mitigation 
practitioners. Further, risk mitigation practitioners work in very uncertain contexts. 
Natural hazard events are, by definition, powerful spatio-temporal events, that 
generate a chaotic complexity of unique uncertainties, affecting entire 
landscapes and all lives within those landscapes.  
 
Without greater insight into how science and other forms of knowledge are used 
in sector policy and practice, the ability of policymakers and practitioners to 
explain risk mitigation and translate its basis is compromised. The sector does not 
receive the full range of information it requires, and it continues to be vulnerable 
to the perpetuation of received ideas and ‘myths’ about science, its use and its 
utility. In this project we asked:   
 
Given that uncertainty is an inherent part of scientific practice and 
method, and risk mitigation is also inherently uncertain, how do risk 
mitigation practitioners manage these uncertainties in their decision-
making?  
 
Through case study research directly with practitioners, our research moves 
beyond the simplistic assumption that science can be directly translated into 
policy and practice. We documented and analysed how risk practitioners 
express and manage the different uncertainties they face with both knowledge 
and natural hazards, including the cycles of inquiry and blame that follow large 
and catastrophic natural hazard events. Through this, our research has provided 
an improved understanding of knowledge pathways and an improved basis for 
articulating and defending science-based decision-making in natural hazard risk 
mitigation. Further, our findings show how the ‘knowledge work’ of qualitative 
research is not esoteric, but essential to risk mitigation.  
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BACKGROUND 
Instead of simply relying on facts to generate better policy and practice 
outcomes, as invaluable as they are, we join with those who ask what are ‘facts’, 
and how do facts, values and action interrelate (Beck, 2010; Durant, 2016; 
Kerkhoff and Lebel, 2006). This requires paying particular attention to reflexivity, 
which examines the foundations of how we think about something, rather than 
the more commonplace reflection, which examines what we think about 
something.  
In this section we introduce some conceptual matters concerning scientific facts, 
subjectivity, decision making, risk and risk mitigation. We track how 
facts/objectivity and values/subjectivity are differently and similarly constituted; 
including how they inform and form each other. This enables a greater 
understanding of how practitioners use different sources of knowledge, including 
research expertise, intuition, and professional, experiential, and local knowledge.   
We have defined ‘science’ as the legacy term that people are most familiar with 
– that is, the research and methods of the natural and physical sciences, as well 
as the institutions, practices and values that are created alongside. For example, 
maths, physics, chemistry, biology, hydrology, meteorology, climate science, 
agent modelling, and fire science.  
1. SCIENTIFIC FACTS 
 
Science is unique in its specific practices that are designed to be replicated by 
anyone to produce the same findings. Through the iconic scientific method of 
experimentation and observation, science creates ‘falsifiable facts’ or ‘scientific 
facts’ – facts that are known to be true until they are proved otherwise. Scientific 
unity is found and undone through processes of scientific consensus and 
dissensus (Pickering 2008). Scientific studies are constantly evolving through 
highly specialised, fragmented, and diverse disciplinary approaches.    
 
The scientific method is designed to remove subjective human perspectives; 
however, it will always include the values of the people who undertake and fund 
it. Scientists, administrators, governments and others make decisions about which 
questions to pursue, which arguments to make more forcefully, what standards 
of proof are needed, which uncertainties to rule in or out of the scope, and so 
on (Table 1).  
1.1 The use and utility of science  
 
In liberal democracies (and elsewhere), the extraordinary strengths of science 
have become glossed as ‘objective facts’ that are useful for decision making. 
This is the reductionist or instrumental approach to science and its use, which 
assumes that:  
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• science generates objective facts, that are value free and independent 
of politics; and,   
• these facts can be directly used for better policy and practice decision 
making. 
 
This arrangement dovetails with the accountability and transparency values of 
democracy; for example, in the oft repeated phrase ‘evidenced-based policy 
and practice’ (Durant 2010).  
 
However, such reductionist approaches to science are routinely confounded by 
the complexity of reality, as is well known by both the scientists and decision 
makers (Morss et al. 2005). The science-action pipeline is no such thing. It is neither 
unidirectional nor rational, science and policy are not separate domains, and, 
facts and values themselves are not separate.  
 
Yet, the promise of linearity and certainty persists. Natural hazard managers often 
expect, and are expected, to achieve outcomes by using scientific facts as a 
rational problem-solving tool to make more certain decisions in the face of 
hazardous events (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003). At the same time, the 
overwhelming uncertainties of natural hazards means that this sector has always 
set different terms to the assumptions of the science-action pipeline.  
 
The problems of this context play out in the public sphere of political, media, and 
quasi-judicial inquiries that follow large natural hazard events, where the focus is 
on apportioning blame for ‘what went wrong’ (Eburn and Dovers, 2015: 501; 
Shrum, 2014). 
 
1.2 Post-truth politics  
 
Recent contestations over ‘facts’ have brought the relationship between 
science and democracy into the centre of public debate. The rise of populism 
has placed ‘truth’ in the hands of elite populists, with experts to be distrusted. 
Scientists have staged protests to defend the value of their methods and results.  
 
This questioning of scientific expertise has occurred around: 
 
• high-profile debates in which science has been cast as unreliable, 
controversial, and dangerous (e.g. climate change, nuclear power, 
genetically-modified organisms, fracking, and invasive species); and,  
• the selective use of scientific facts by governments to support political 
agendas and shutdown public debate (Whatmore 2009).  
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1.3 Locating facts through degrees of certainty 
 
Instead of requiring science to be objective if it is to be scientific, it is better to 
consider different degrees of certainty and uncertainty. For example, there is 
strong scientific agreement about the existence of anthropogenic climate 
change, more contested scientific debate about its specific causes and effects, 
and exploratory ‘blue sky’ science about possible ameliorating technologies.  
 
With a nuanced approach, science is no longer vulnerable to charges of not 
being objective. This is not to neglect what is unique about science, and thus 
where its traction lies; but allows a better understanding of its contribution, 
including in relation to other sources of knowledge.  
 
1.4 Knowledge plurality  
 
Through understanding how knowledge is formed, practiced, and re-formed as 
‘justifiable belief’, different sets of knowledge can be identified:  
 
Scientific knowledge, for example, must be justifiable according to the 
standards set by adherence to accepted scientific practice and peer 
review. Local knowledge must be justifiable according to claims of 
connection with a particular place. Practical knowledge is justifiable on 
the basis of experience in practice, and political knowledge must be 
justifiable according to experience within the political process. (van 
Kerkhoff and Lebel, 2006: 447).  
 
Decision-makers are still required to evaluate the different knowledge sources 
they have access to, but with a greater awareness of knowledge practices and 
plurality. This helps address the unrealistic deference to science as the 
knowledge expertise of choice. 
 
1.5 Valuing values 
 
Whilst values are ever present in natural hazard risk mitigation, the importance of 
science has meant that expertise in subjectivity is relatively under-explored, 
under-represented and downplayed (Sword-Daniels et al., 2015: 292). This has 
resulted in a knowledge deficit for practitioners. 
 
In addition, science has become so influential that:  
 
• questions about values are being expected to be answered through the 
debate of facts; rather than also considering expert scholarship on values 
(Durant, 2016: 21); and, 
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• the kinds of answers that science can provide, are forming the type of 
questions that are being asked in the first place. 
 
For example, the predictive sciences are given the authority to determine the 
climate change problem and our responses to it, when these are value questions 
about how we want to live and why (Rigg and Mason, 2018).  
 
To persist with governance approaches that only focus on the facts, is not to 
exclude values, but to suppress some values for others: 
 
with those whose values are left out rejecting the other side’s ‘truth’ as 
merely politics by another name. (Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017: 763) 
 
2. RISK FRAMES  
 
Risk and risk mitigation may seem to be self-evident terms; however, they are 
complex, and viewed differently from different viewpoints. Exploring and 
accepting this complexity, generates opportunities to clarify misunderstandings, 
identify uncertainties, and establish broader grounds for learning and action.  
 
2.1 Risk is not the hazard  
 
Risk is often equated with the hazard, but it is explicitly defined by the natural 
hazard sector as the interaction of hazards, communities and the environment 
(COAG, 2011: 22). Risk mitigation requires attending to how these are 
differentially imbricated, before, during and after hazard events. 
 
2.2 Risk is a combination of social and natural  
 
The significance of the natural hazard sector’s focus on risk, rather than the 
hazard, is that it is responsive to and embraces our co-located natural and social 
worlds. Natural forces are pre-dominant in natural hazard events; however, these 
events are also always social phenomena in how we experience and 
understand them, as well as how our decisions mitigate and/or amplify them. For 
example, wildfires are often considered preventable in social, political and 
regulatory spheres (Sherry et al., 2019), whilst floods are considered as 
unpreventable and thus are more pro-actively planned for (Mercer et al., 2011).  
 
This is a very different viewpoint to that which places nature as the background 
for human activity, and over which humans dominate. The clash of viewpoints is 
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evident when the natural hazard sector is required to explain that risk mitigation 
is not ‘stopping the hazard’. That would be called risk elimination. 
 
2.3 Risk values are not self-evident  
 
The precursor to undertaking risk mitigation is deciding what are the priorities to 
protect. Traditionally, risk values are listed as – the primacy of life, built assets, and 
the environment. However, these are not self-evident. Further, there is a paucity 
of research into what is even considered at risk. For example, after the primacy 
of human life, is it property (and is that insured/uninsured, commercial/residential, 
and/or holiday/work property?), community assets (halls/clubs, infrastructure, 
water/soil health, and/or aesthetic/recreational places?), Aboriginal peoples’ 
values (cultural-historic heritage sites, intergenerational practices, and/or 
Country in general?), environmental values (ecological communities and/or 
carbon emissions?), and so on.  
2.3 Risk mitigation is bound up in values 
 
Risk mitigation practices themselves require value decisions. For example, risk 
mitigation practice prioritises activities that are quantifiable, such as prescribed 
burning, and building levees and dams. (Sword-Daniels et al., 2015; Sherry et al., 
2019). This relates to how reductionist approaches to science and its use informs 
what is viewed by society and political leaders as evidenced based policy and 
practice.  
 
Recently, the natural hazard sector has begun using the language of ‘resilience’ 
and ‘vulnerability’, explicitly linking risk mitigation within the ‘public good’ goal 
of sustainability (COAG 2011; AGD 2017). This includes adopting participatory 








This project used qualitative social science and humanities methods to 
investigate and analyse how diverse knowledges are ordered and judged as 
salient, credible and authoritative, and the consequences for risk mitigation 
practice. We drew on critical theory, narrative analysis, literature reviews and 
fieldwork to support our interpretation and argument.  
 
We had three key tasks:  
1. Investigate the diversity and uncertainty of bushfire and flood science, 
and its contribution to risk mitigation policy and planning; 
2. Explore how diverse individuals use and understand scientific evidence 
and other knowledges in their bushfire and flood risk mitigation roles; 
and, 
3. Analyse how this interaction produces particular kinds of opportunities 
and challenges in the policy, practice, law and governance of bushfire 
and flood risk mitigation. 
 
Three case studies were identified in consultation with our end user group, each 
located in an important risk landscapes, in which scientific knowledge was being 
used to change policy and/or practice: 
 
• Wildfire risk and prescribed burning, in the Barwon-Otway region, 
Victoria;  
• Wildfire risk and an invasive fire-weed, in the Greater Darwin area, 
Northern Territory; and, 
• Flood risk and mitigation planning in the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley, 
New South Wales. 
 
Conducting empirical research directly with practitioners was prioritised, 
because it enabled tracking their use of science over time and within the 
communities and landscapes where they work. This has facilitated greater insight 
into practitioner meanings about certainty, linearity, and science. The case study 
methods are detailed further in the case study section.   
 
Our key milestones were set around our core research activities – a review of 
scenario exercises, a literature review, the case studies, and this synthesis report.  
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LITERATURE REVIEWS 
1. SCENARIO EXERCISE METHODS 
 
Scenario exercises were proposed in the project plan, as part of the case 
studies. To investigate this possibility, we conducted research into: what 
scenario exercise are, why they are used, and, how they can be used to 
achieve the aims of the RMPP project.  
 
Approximately 250 sources on scenario exercises, methodology, analysis, and 
design were reviewed. The key findings of the review were:  
• Two dominant approaches to scenario exercises exist. In one, scenario 
exercises involve the generation of predictive models of possible future 
events through combined quantitative analyses. In the other, scenario 
exercises involve participants of various kinds responding to possible future 
events in order to pay attention to how knowledge of such futures is 
produced.  
• There are many methodological lessons to be drawn from the existing use 
of scenario exercises.  
• While they can bring together diverse expert knowledges to better 
understand complex systems, the focus is often on the product and not 
the process.  
 
This work informed our approach to the scenario exercises in the case study 
fieldwork. These took the second approach, and can also be described as a 
facilitated group discussion about future scenarios.  
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2.  SCIENTIFIC DIVERSITY AND UNCERTAINTY  
 
We published a literature review and journal article which surveyed the key 
scientific uncertainties encountered, managed and utilised by practitioners 
involved in bushfire and flood risk mitigation practices in Australia. Scientific 
uncertainties are those ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’ that 




• Bushfire and flood risk mitigation sciences have specific uncertainties, 
but they also share some common practices and common uncertainties. 
For example, imperfect historical data, fluid entities (climate, weather, 
flora, fauna and human populations), and widespread practical issues, 
such as the ‘data and computational friction’ generated by modelling 
and the unavoidably fragmented work of data collection and storage.  
 
We organised these uncertainties into three categories:  
 
• Historicist uncertainties are those uncertainties which emerge from the 
reliance of scientific knowledge on archives of historical data;  
• Instrumental uncertainties are those uncertainties which emerge from 
the limitations of a given apparatus, heuristic or theory; and,  
• Interventionist uncertainties are those uncertainties in the predictive 
calculations about the effect of mitigation interventions 
 
Table 1 summarises our findings across these three categories for both wildfire 
and flood risk.  
 
These categories are a teaching and organizational device for practitioners 
and scholars to interpret the science knowledge they are working with.   
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Uncertainty type Key forms Elaboration  
Historicist – uncertainty 
arising out of reliance on 
historical data, due to 
assumed determining 
relationship between the 
past, the present and the 
future 
a) Gaps and 
inconsistencies in 
historical datasets on 
relevant environmental 
variables  
Gaps can arise out of: innovations in measuring apparatuses; variations 
in data metrics; variations in the geographical spread of measuring 
apparatuses; unreliable measurements; commercially sensitive data 
collections; fragmented storage; and, funding constraints.  
b) Relative rarity, 
uniqueness and force 
of a given hazard 
event 
 
Lack of historical exemplars is a barrier to validation and prediction. 
Measuring apparatuses can be destroyed during hazard event. Relative 
randomness of bushfire ignition points, and fire behaviour unique to fire-
terrain and fire-atmosphere interactions.  
c) Assumption that natural 
systems fluctuate within 
an envelope of 
variability known as 
‘stationarity’ 
Climate change requires recognition of both temporal and spatial 
variability into the future, the parameters of which are uncertain.   
Instrumental – 
uncertainty arising out of 
limitations of a given 
apparatus, heuristic or 
theory1  
a) Difficulty of capturing 
hazard behaviours in 





E.g.: the complexity of feedback mechanisms between fire and 
atmosphere. Difficulties with behavioural algorithms include historicist 
uncertainties, such as data limits. Data synthesis strains against 
computational resources and reporting requirements.   
b) Limits to modelling of 
at-risk assets and values 
 
Spatially static entities (e.g. property, infrastructure) can be incorporated 
into topographical modelling; but spatially dynamic entities (e.g. human 





E.g. McArthur FFDI. Standards do not include all available data but 
remain in use because of resource limitations, institutional preferences 
and literacies. These also iteratively influence the framing of scientific 
methods and projects.  
Interventionist – 
uncertainty inherent in 
the predictive 
calculations about the 






Mitigation benefits have their own historicist and instrumental 
uncertainties. Selection of benefit metrics influenced by non-scientific 
aspects such as policy priorities, social values, and political context. 
 
Uncertain effects of interventions on at-risk values, e.g.:  ‘safe 
development paradox’; the ecological effects of prescribed burning. 
Uncertainty surrounding implementation of interventions. These 
unintended consequences should be considered calculable and non-
calculable uncertainties. 
b) Reflexivity, with respect 
to parameters and 





TABLE 1: UNCERTAINTY CATEGORIES FOR SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE USED IN BUSHFIRE AND FLOOD RISK MITIGATION  
 
  
                                                        
1 Note that bushfire risk is typically figured on likelihood of conducive conditions not on likelihood 
of occurrence.  Flood risk is usually calculated in two ways: the likelihood of occurrence of rain-
driven flood events; and, the spatial modelling of flood behaviour.  




Three case studies were conducted with wildfire and flood risk practitioners in 
Australia (Tables 2 and 3).   
1. METHOD 
 
Our fieldwork methods centred on spending time with people and places, with 
specific methods including landscape immersion, participant observation, 
document analysis, repeat semi-structured interviews, and a facilitated group 
discussion at each location. Methods were adapted as the project developed 
and in response to specific case study priorities.  
 
We defined practitioners broadly as the people who are professionally 
engaged in the various processes involved in developing and implementing risk 
mitigation strategies, whether executives, field officers, planners, modellers, or 
public officials in research positions. In both the Barwon-Otway and Greater 
Darwin area case studies, one or two university researchers were also 
interviewed on the basis of their close professional engagement with the 
practitioners. 
 
Case study Individuals interviewed Workshop group Fieldwork host organisation 
Barwon-Otway Region, 
Victoria 
21 12 Department of Environment, Land, Water and 
Planning  
Greater Darwin Area, 
Northern Territory 
27 14 Bushfires NT 
Hawkesbury-Nepean 
Valley, New South Wales 
22 17 Hawkesbury-Nepean Flood Management 
Taskforce 
TABLE 2: CASE STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
 









rural & coastal towns. 
Very limited exit 
routes.  
Gentrification of 
coastal areas, rural 
decline, summer 
tourism  
Moderate – regular local bushfire 






fuelled wildfire  
Peri-urban & rural 
tropical savannah  
Frontier expansion Low – new out of town Gamba 
grass growth, plus familiarity with 
cool dry season fires.  
Hawkesbury-
Nepean Valley, 






floodplains for multiple 
rivers, rural, peri-urban 
and urban edge. Very 
limited exit routes from 
many areas 
Intense residential 
housing pressure for 
Sydney 
Low – confusing and often 
difficult to see. The last two 
serious floods were 1961 (15 
metres above sea level) and 
1867 (19 metres)  
TABLE 3: CASE STUDY RISK LANDSCAPES 
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2. CASE STUDY SNAPSHOTS 
 
2.1 The Australian case studies   
 
Each case study was located in an important risk landscapes, in which scientific 
knowledge was being used to change policy and/or practice: 
 
• The Barwon-Otway region is a rugged forested coastal and rural area in 
southwest Victoria where peak bushfire risk periods coincide with peak 
summer holiday seasons, and evacuation routes are choked with tourist 
buses. This region was selected because practitioners were piloting the 
use of a two-dimensional computational model (PHOENIX RapidFire, or 
‘PHOENIX’) to simulate fire risk and identify prescribed burning 
management priorities. To address limitations with the bio-physical 
model, practitioners developed quantitative datasets of qualitative 
values, such as ‘sense of place’ and ‘community resilience’. Also, two 
years of community meetings were held to learn more about local 
priorities, and build and strengthen relationships around risk 
responsibilities. Described as a ‘more scientific’ strategic approach to 
wildfire risk, the pilot helped inform the state-wide debates on 
quantitative prescribed burning targets.  
 
• In the Greater Darwin area, huge climactic flux between wet and dry 
seasons supports vigorous grass growth and curing. This case study was 
selected because wildfire risk is dramatically changing with the spread 
of Gamba grass (Andropogon gayanus). This invasive weed fuels high 
intensity fires that destroy savannah habitat, allowing for further invasion 
in a self-perpetuating ‘grass-fire cycle’ that has the potential to spread 
across Australia’s northern savanaah (Setterfield et al., 2010). Scientific 
research has provided a degree of certainty about these threats, and 
helped create policy change in 2008; however, it is widely understood 
that subsequent action has been insufficient. Knowing this, practitioners 
expressed feelings of futility and despair about their work and the 
unrealised promise of impactful scientific results. 
 
• On the flood plains of the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley in Western 
Sydney, political leaders must make development decisions for a largely 
risk-unaware populace. These floodplains are prone to very low-
probability but very high-impact floods. Following the Brisbane and New 
South Wales floods (2011 and 2013), the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley 
Flood Management Taskforce was established to advise the state 
government. During our fieldwork, the Taskforce’s work included flood 
modelling, scenario building, social network analysis, spatial and 
transportation route mapping and evacuation modelling, combined 
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with field research and consultation. The Taskforce consciously engaged 
with uncertainty rather than avoiding or minimising it.  
 
2.1 The Canadian case study  
An additional international case study was added to the project in response to 
Canadian interest in the methodology. Led by Professor Tara McGee, and 
assisted by postdoctoral researcher Dr Jenny Sherry, this research examined how 
wildfire managers used scientific and other forms of knowledge to generate a 
new wildfire risk management plan for the Lac La Biche Forest Area. The 
Canadian costs of the research were funded by the Government of Alberta 
Wildfire Science and Technology Program with a CAD $20,000  grant. The costs 
of Dr Neale’s travel were covered by the RMPP project.  
Due to time limitations, the results of the Canadian case study were not included 
in the comparative analysis of the Australian case studies; however, they did 
provide additional insights for the broader synthesis discussion and implications, 








The synthesis brings together the results of the three Australian case studies of 
practitioner experiences with reductionist/instrumental approaches to science 
and its use.  
1. PRACTITIONER EXPERIENCES 
 
Across these diverse case studies, clear commonalities can be drawn: 
 
• Science is critical, but it is not everything  
All the practitioners placed a high value on the use of science; however, 
the idea that ‘more science’ is needed was not a priority in any case 
study. Science does not resolve the big questions the practitioners had 
about what society values. 
 
• Complexity is irreducible  
The practitioners were keenly aware that risk mitigation is full of cultural 
values and other subjective ‘non-rational’ factors, that cannot be 
reduced to prediction or modelling.  
 
• Experience is vital, although seen as less authoritative 
The practitioners valued their intuition and experiential, local and 
professional knowledge with the risk landscape and communities, and 
other hazard events. Yet many practitioners often apologised for, 
disparaged or marginalised this knowledge, for not carrying the authority 
of knowledge arising out of formalised methodologies. 
 
• Making things ‘count’ is important  
Science was judged as more authoritative than other evidenced-based 
expertise. Practitioners spoke about how some people living within risk 
landscapes highly value science for its assumed capacity to produce 
‘hard data’ to be used in practice and policy, in a way that, as some 
practitioners expressed, was not similarly understood as possible with 
data from qualitative research.  
 
• There is confusion about what is a fact 
The practitioners’ own assumptions about using science to secure 
objectivity and certainty were either internalised, acknowledged as an 
externally required goal, or both. Practitioners regularly expressed 
opposing positions about certainty, and it was common for 
misunderstandings to proliferate around what is meant by the ‘facts’ 
within the sector.  
 
SCIENTIFIC DIVERSITY, SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND RISK MITIGATION POLICY AND PLANNNG | REPORT NO. 494.2019 
 22 
• Science has a social life 
Practitioners were in a unique position to influence outcomes through 
how they selected, interpreted, used, modified and presented science. 
When evaluating complex science, practitioners often drew on 
relationships of trust with individuals, who were not necessarily scientists.  
 
• Practitioners are not automatons 
Practitioners seek out different strategies to address the problematics of 
their current work context within their capacity, time, logistical and 
material constraints, and in relation to their own perceptions and 
priorities of natural hazards, risk, and risk mitigation. 
 
• Success is often neither attainable nor evident  
Practitioners are focused on anticipating large and catastrophic natural 
hazard events, although saw their mitigation work as most effective with 
respect to moderate natural hazard events. Yet, their decisions in 
relation to smaller events may go unnoticed precisely because this work 
might have been effective, whilst it is the large events where their 
actions will be scrutinized (Eburn and Dovers 2015).  
 
• Decision making is embodied  
Many practitioners spoke about the anticipatory stress they experienced 
because of their role, and how it can keep them awake at night. They 
connected the full spectrum of complexity they faced, with their 
personal concern for the people present in a risk landscape during a 
hazard event, and their limited capacity to mitigate risk.  
 
The most striking difference amongst the three case studies was the perception 
of risk between southern Australia, and that of the Greater Darwin Area. The 
monsoonal savannah was not yet seen as a catastrophic fire risk landscape by 
those that matter – political leaders and influential electorates.  
 
2. CONSEQUENCES FOR PRACTICE  
 
Influential assumptions about the linear ‘pipeline’ use and utility of scientific 
expertise have substantial consequences for practice:  
 
• less efficient use of research-practice risk mitigation monies,  
• more stressful work conditions for risk mitigation practitioners, and  
• less effective risk mitigation policies and practices for all.  
 
Across all case studies, differently placed practitioners worked to address these 
problematics within their capacity, time, logistical and material constraints. In 
this, they demonstrated how it is possible to avoid being bound by reductionist 
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approaches. Our research shows that this sector is providing leadership on 
engaging with natural and social complexity through seeking out knowledge 
plurality and reflexivity, and avoid ideological retreat and polarisation. Their 
initiatives have generated possible alternative starting points to reconsider the 
purpose, consequences and limits of mitigation. This is critical in this time of global 
environmental crises, which are amplifying natural hazard risk, and undermining 









As natural hazard risk mitigation is inherently complex, knowledge plurality is 
needed for practitioners to better understand where the contribution of science 
lies, where the contribution of other knowledge lies, and the differing value and 
utility these have to the matter of concern. With this, they can better make and 
defend their risk mitigation decisions. In support, we offer natural hazard risk 
mitigation practitioners these guidelines, noting that we are reflecting back 
many of their insights shared with us. 
 
These guidelines are centred on moving from finding the risk mitigation solution, 
to the pragmatics of embracing risk complexity and uncertainty. We see this 
sector is already doing this work, and in doing so, is providing leadership for the 
broader public sector which is grappling with related issues of climate change 
and sustainability.   
 
 
1. Complexity is irreducible  
 
It is important to keep engaging consciously and visibly with complexity and 
uncertainty rather than seeking to reduce or eliminate it. For example, continuing 
to emphasize that: a consequential nature necessarily limits the expectations of 
risk mitigation possibilities; subjective and other ‘irrational’ matters are present 
throughout natural hazard events and their risk mitigation; and, that knowledge 
is always partial and plural.  
 
2. Reflexivity and the possible  
 
It is important to keep developing understandings that practitioners are not 
external to the risk mitigation problem but part of it, and thus reflective and 
reflexive approaches are needed to unpack the understandings of individuals 
and institutions. For example, processes such as reframing, domain mapping and 
group discussions, allow participants to understand different perspectives and 
review their own assumptions in light of other knowledge. This helps generate 
possible alternative starting points to reconsider the purpose, consequences and 
limits of risk mitigation.  
 
3. Problems and solutions as complex and plural 
 
It is important to continue with the general understanding that all solutions are 
partial and provisional, that the problem definition itself depends on the 
knowledge and values held by people, and that any resolution is likely to result 
in further issues emerging (e.g. Clarke and Ashhurst, 2018).  
 
4. Knowledge plurality is integral to decision making 
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It is important to continue to state that diverse knowledge sources are necessarily 
for risk mitigation, as this is responsive to the social and environmental complexity 
that constitutes the risk. As part this, it is appropriate to identify and evaluate 
different knowledge sets, including against their own standards of justification.   
 
5. Secure complexity within the expertise base 
 
It is important to continue engaging with expertise that understands facts and 
values together. For example, through: qualitative, interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary research projects and partnerships; the recruitment of 
individuals with relevant expertise; and, using methods that support knowledge 
co-creation and sharing. This includes understanding that participatory 
approaches only go so far. Exchanging viewpoints about the ‘facts’, is not the 
same as securing expertise in subjectivity (Durant 2016).  
 
6. Complexity has navigational tools 
 
It is important to keep finding and using tools to navigate complexity, without 
simplifying it. For example, creating temporary boundaries around an area of 
work to limit uncertainty for that in the short-term, while knowing and accepting 
that uncertainty remains pre-dominant throughout. 
 
7. Support experimentation and iterative learning 
 
Keep encouraging a dynamic learning context, in which experimentation is 
allowed, and failure appreciated as part of the learning process.  
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UTILISATION ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS 
In addition to regularly meeting with our end users, and providing updates 
through a quarterly newsletter, which was then published in part on the BNHCRC 
website, we undertook the following utilisation activities and outputs.  
1. APPLIED RESEARCH APPROACH 
Our research approach involved the end users directly as we did the research. 
For example, the workshops held in the case study locations were also an 
opportunity for practitioner reflection, networking, and learning. 
2. FLYER AND GUIDELINES 
A guideline and flyer have been prepared, summarising the findings of the 
research in brief, with specific guidelines for practitioners. The draft guidelines are 
reproduced within this report.  
3. UTILISATION WORKSHOP AND COMMUNICATION TOOLS 
 
The workshop ‘Making Science Social: Making sense of risk & uncertainty’ was 
convened by Jessica Weir, Elizabeth Clarke, Timothy Neale and Craig Ashhurst, 
and facilitated by Liz and Craig (Sydney, 7 September 2017). Twenty people 
attended, including participants from each of the three case study areas 
(Barwon-Otway, Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley and Greater Darwin area), as well 
as key end users.   
 
The workshop introduced participants to techniques and tools to help bring 
scientific and societal knowledge together, in order to tackle complexity and 
uncertainty in risk mitigation. Workshop participants were provided with summary 
research results from across the three case studies, and a “Risk Thinking Toolbox” 
was presented, which included the following four items: 
 
1. A tool for navigating between science and practice: “The thinking wave” 
2. A Brainstorming tool: concept mapping 
3. A sensemaking tool: the wicked problems framework 
4. A tool for surfacing tacit knowledge: a systems iceberg  
 
All of the tools are designed to enable stakeholders with different expertise and 
backgrounds to share knowledge and synthesize a diversity of risk mitigation 
expertise, viewpoints and experience. The tools were chosen to meet the needs 
identified by the research results. We note that the tools shared at the workshop 
were not a result of the RMPP project, but were developed previously by Craig 
Ashhurst and Liz Clarke.  
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4. INDUSTRY PRESENTATIONS AND SEMINARS  
 
In brief we have presented at five Research Advisory Forums (2014-2018), given 
five AFAC conference presentations (2015-2017), and presented at the BNHCRC 
Showcase 2017. In addition, we have presented to:  Forest Fuels Management 
Workshop (Hinton, Canada, 2014); Information Share, NSW Rural Fire Services, 
(Sydney, 2015); DWELP (Melbourne, 2016); Wildfire Management Branch, 
(Edmonton, Canada, 2016); AFACs Predictive Services Group, 2017; and, 
Bushfires NT and others (Darwin, 2018). The industry presentations and seminars 
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WHERE TO FROM HERE 
We continue to present at industry events, and engage with our case study 
partners, as well as publish and conduct ongoing research about the role of 
science in natural hazard risk mitigation, as well as sustainability and climate 
change more generally. This includes: 
 
• Timothy Neale is researching wildfire risk in the Northern Territory and 
Victoria as part of his ARC DECRA project Pyrosecurity: understanding 
and managing bushfires in a changing climate. 
• The RMPP project has been succeeded by the ‘Hazards, Culture and 
Indigenous Communities’ BNHCRC project. This project analyses the 
engagement between the natural hazard sector and Indigenous 
communities across southern Australia. This brings the particular insights 
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